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How Deep the Chasm?
A Reply to Owen and Mosser's Review
David L. Paulsen and R. Dennis Potter
In the ir well-argued and insight ful review of How Wide rhe
Divide? Owen and Mosser assen that the book is a pos itive step
toward a Mormo n-evangelica l d ialogue. They conti nue that dialogue by shedding more light on the nalure of the theological divide between Laller-day Saints (he reafl er often LOS) and evan·
gelicals by offe ring fai r-minded. yet fo rmidab le. criticisms of the
LDS view as presented by Rob inson. 1 We welcome the chance to
join thi s discussion. OUf rep ly to their review will focus on the ir
critique, continuing the d ialogue by defend ing the LOS views th at
have been challenged. We wi ll also raise some concerns of OUf
own about the corresponding evangelical beliefs. Owen and
Mosser's criticisms of LOS views fa ll into three broad categories:
( I) revelation, (2) the nature of God , and (3) salvation. We wi ll
address these in this order.

Revela tion
An Open Canon?
T he fi rst issue that Owen and Mosser (w hose review is cited
parenthetically as O& M) di scuss is whcther the canon is open o r
closcd. 2 Mormonism cla ims that the canon is open, i.e .. that there
We are qui te impressed with Owen and Mosser" s grasp of Latter-day
Saint thought and scholarship. It is apparent that they have read a wide range of
LDS works (including the standard works). and they give these works a chari table
reading. This strengthens their positions, since it helps to avoid the al .....ays pervasive straw. man fallacy.
2
Of course. for a Latter-day Saint thc possibility of an open canon is no t
an open issuc. Lattcr.day Saints have records of revelation (i.c .• scripture) in
addition to the Bible. There actually is continuing revelation that has been
canonized. And so, for Lattcr-day Saints. thc question of its possibility is moot.
The real issuc. from an eV:lIlgelical perspective. should be whe thc r what Latterday Sa ints claim to be scripture rell/ly is scripture. Ncverthelcss. we can engllge

222

FARMS RE VIEW OF BOOKS Il f2( I999)

is continuing revelation and that some of this revelation has been
authoritative ly canoni zed .3 It is important to note thai the issut!s
o f whether the cano n is open and whether the re can be co ntinuing
revelation are not necessarily identica l, at least from an LDS po int
o f view. Lauer-day Saints lend to identify revelation with a ny
communicati on from God to humanity , and scripture with records
of revelatio n that have been accepted as binding and hence as
canon by the common consent of the community of Sainls. So,
the question about a n open canon is a question about officiall
auth oritati ve scripture a nd the question about whether there is
continuing revelat ion is a questio n about com municat ion between
God and humanity . Since not every co mmunicat ion between God
and humanity is recorded in scripture, one could believe in continuing reve lation without believing in an ope n canon. Of course,
for Lauer-day Saints it is on the basis of continuing revelatio n
from God that we can expand on the canon. And so the issues are
certainly re lated but not identical. 4
Now, Owen and Mosser point ou l thaI Robinson's primary
biblical argument for an open canon is an argument from silence:
the Bible does nOl say that it provides sufficient info rmation for
salvation, and so Latter-day Saints have no reason to think that it
docs . Owen and Mosser respond with their own a rgu ment fro m
silence by pointing out that the evangel ical can say that the Bible
does not say that it does not provide sufficient in fo rmati on for
salvm ion. Of course, if these were the only arguments to consider
then we would seem to be in a stalemate- this fac t reminds us why
an argument from silence is not a good argument. Fortunate ly,
there is more for us to consider.
the possibility question in order to open up a serious consideration of the more
substantive question of whether LDS scripture is ve ridical. For it seems that all
the doct rinal differences between Latter-day Saints and our evangclica l friends
cou ld turn on whether what we count as scripture really is scripture.
3
For a brief review of the WS conccpt of an open canon, see Kent P.
Jackson, "Latter-day Saints: A DynamiC Scriptural Process," in The Holy Book
;n Comparative Perspeclil'e, ed. Frederick M. Denny and Rodney L. Taylor
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1985).63-83.
4
We hclieve that thi~ also points tn a dirference in the ways in which
evangelicals and Laller-day Saints define revelation. For evangelicals the ten·
dency is 10 identify revelation with scripture (i.e., canon). and so the issue of an
open canon becomes identical to the issue of continuing revelation.
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For example, we mi ght argue that the question becomes one
of burden of proof. And here we think the burden of proof rests
clearly on those who advocate a closed canon.s The reason fo r
this is simple. In suppos ing that new revelation is poss ible we are
suppos ing that God may have somethin g he wants us to know.
Indeed. how could we know that we have received all the trut hs
that he wants us to know unless he tells us Ihat we have?6 Clearl y
his telli ng us certain tru ths does not imply th at he has no mo re
truths to tell us. To clai m that the canon is open is to claim that
God mi ght have something else to say; and that is a much mo re
modest clai m than saying that God does 1I0 r have anything else to
say. Without convincin g positive ev idence for the latter claim. we
have every reason to th ink that God might still have somethin g to
say. So. the presu mption is in favor of an open canon.

S
In maki ng this claim. we do not mean that proponents of a closed
canon must prove their position as a logician would prove a theore m. Rather. we
mea n that they h:lVe the burden to present positive evidence for their position
sufficie nt to offset the nalurnl presumption against it. Unles s Imd un til they do.
their position cannot be accepted as credible. If and when they do. Lauer-day
Saints would be expectcd 10 address their 3rgUments.
6
Joseph Smith tu rns this question into an argumenl:
We have what we have, and the Bible contains what it does conla in:
but 10 say that God never said anything more to man tha n is there
recorded. would be saying at once that we have at last received a
revelation: for it must require one to advance thus far, because it is
nowhere said in that volume by the mouth of God that He would
not. after giving what is there contained, speak again; and if any
man has found out for a fac t that the Bible contai ns al l that Goo
ever revealed to mall he has ascertained it by an immediate revelalion. (Teachings of tire Propiret Jost'ph Smith. compo Joseph Fielding Smit h [Sail Lake City: Descret Book. 1976J. 61)
This argument could be framed as a reductio ad absurdum. Suppose that we
can know that there can be no extrabiblical revelation. The only way to know
this would be by revelatio n. But the Bible contains no such revelation. Hence.
the only way to know that there is no extrabibiical revelatiol\ is by an extrabiblical revelatio n. But this is self-contradictory. Of course. this is not Owen
and Mosser's position as we understand it. Admitting no convincing biblical
basis for their poSition. they advance rational arguments in support of their
claim that the canon is closed. But il docs seem passing strange that God would
leave a question as important as this one to be resolved only by human reason.
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Now Owen and Mosser seem to recognize this burden of
proof, since they go on to make positive arguments for the claim

thai the canon is effectively closed'? One reason they advance for
holding that the canon is effectively closed (although perhaps not
closed in principle) is that any new revelation would be "an ticlimactic" (O&M, 13). We are nol sure what the theolog ica l import of "anticlimactic" would be. If it merely means that the incarnation and atonement of Jesus Christ are the most imp0rlum
events in the history of the world, then we would agree that anything that follows is anticlimactic. But anticlimactic revelation is
revelat ion nevertheless. And its anticlimactic nature might be
mitigated by the fact that it all points back to the climax. 8
On the other hand, if "anticlimactic" is supposed to mean
something like "superfluou s," this would hardly seem to be the
case from the LOS perspective. Indeed, that God the Father and
Jesus Christ appeared to Joseph Smith, that through Joseph they
restored the proper authority to perform sav ing ordinances for the
li ving as well as the dead, that Joseph translated- through divine
inspiration-an ancient text telling how Jesus visited people in
the New World, and that thro ugh Joseph, God restored the ancient temple ceremony , including eternal marriage, hardl y seem
superfluous!
Instead of merely asserting that the above are superfluous,
Owen and Mosser argue that the body of information necessary
for salvation is contained in the Bible (see O&M, 9-10). And this,
coup led with the claim that there is nothing God wants us to know
except that which is what is necessary for salvation, wou ld entail
that God does not have anything more to reveal. The second claim
seems strange indeed; what reason cou ld God have for wanting us
to have salvmion-essent ial knowledge on ly ? Sure ly the Bible itself
contains much informat ion that is not essential to salvat ion. But
laying this puzzle aside, let us cons ider the first premise of thi s
argument. Why should we concede that the Bible contai ns all that
is necessary for salvation? Owen and Mosser argue that our ow n
7
cede

Ih;~

See Owen and Mosser. 10 n. 17. where they appenr to explicitly conpu;nl.

8
We might point out that the Book of Mormon is not anticlimactic.
even in this sense. Indeed. it covers the climactic pari of snlvation history nnd
emphasiles its importance by underlining the testimonies of the apostles.
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third and fourth Articles of Faith togethe r entail that faith, re pentance, baptism, and the gi ft of the Holy Ghost are "all that is
necessary"9 for salvation. But these can all be found in the Bible.
Furthermore, they claim that Rob in son agrees with them. I0 However, it seems clear that the third and fourth Articles of Faith do
not e ntail this. The third article acknowledges that we believe
that throu gh the atonement of Christ all mankind may be saved
through obedience to the laws and ordinances of the gospe l. However, the fourth Article of Faith does not purport to describe all
these laws and ordi nances. Indeed, it spec ifi call y enumerates only
the "first" of these. Usually, when we identify somethin g (o r
some set) as afirst we imply I I that there are others. So, the art icles
themselves seem to imply that faith, repentance, baptism, and the
Holy Ghost may not be enough.
Moreover, in making our position clear on thi s point, we need
to be preci se about what we mean by the word salvation. In Mormon di scourse salvation has several different meanings,I2 and it is
not clear that any of them is identical to what Owen and Mosser
mean when they use the term. In some contexts, salvation refers to
being resurrected and having immortality. In others, salvatiOtI
means inhe ritin g the ce lestial kingdom. And finally, in some uses
of the term someone is saved onl y if she inherits a ll that God
has-i.e., the highest degree of glory in the celest ial kingdom.
Latter-day Sai nts usuall y refer to this latter state as "exaltation. "
Now it is clearly the case that Latter-day Saints should not
admit that all that is necessary for exaltation is included in the
Bible. Indeed , the personal temple ordinances. eterna l marriage,
9
We think that by "all thc truth 'nccessary'" (O&M, 10), they mea n
"severally nccessary and jointly sufficient."
10 Robinson says, "the only obedience nccessary to he born again is
obeying the commandments to have fai th in Christ, \0 repent and to be baptir..ed'·
(~tWD. (57). It is not clear that this means thaI he thinks this is all that is
necessary for salvation. But if so, we wonder how to square such a claim wit h
Book of Mormon teachings such as thai fou nd in 2 Ncphi ] I: 16: "Unless a man
shall cndure to thc cnd. in fo llowing the example of thc Son of the living God.
hc C:lnnOi be s:lved."
II Not "imply" in a logical scnse but in a conversational scnse.
12 See DaHin H. Oaks. "Have You Been Saved'!" Ensign, May 1998.
55-57. where he discusses various meanings of beillg saved for the LOS
audience.

226

FARMS REVIEW QF BQOKS li n ( 1999)

and work for the dead are hardly menti oned there-if at all. An d
how these latter ordinances should be carried out is certainl y not
e xplained. So it should not be conceded that the Sible contains all
that is necessary for sal vati on in the event that salvation and exaltation are used sy nonymously. Of course, one mi ght say that salvation and c",altalion are diffe rent things (as Latte r-day Saints

ofl en do). If so, then Owen and Mosser's argument for a closed
canon clearly breaks dow n at a diffe re nt point. Indeed, if salvation
is not exaltation. but if exaltation is ultimately what God wants for
all of his children, then it would follow that even if the Bible contain s all that is necessary for salvation God might have much more
that he would want to reveal.
But even if we supposed that all the information that is necessary for salvation is incl uded in the Bible, it does not follow that
the canon mu st be closed. First, one might think that the Bible tell s
us what must be done and not how it should be done. For example, let us suppose that the Bible clearl y affir ms that bapt ism is
necessary for salvation. Thi s information alone would not suffice
to make it clear how baptism must be performed and who has the
authority to perform it. And even if the Bible contained information relevant to the resoluti on of these two matters, it wo uld n't
necessarily follow that at some given time someone possessed the
requi site auth ority. Finally, even if the Bible contained all the
know/edge thai one must have in order to be saved,J3 it doesn't
fo llow that every sincere student of the Bible would interpret this
poten tially saving in formati on in the same way. For, notori ously,
the Bible admits of di fferent plausible interpretat ions. Yet, to the
extent that these interpretat ions conflict, at most one of them can
be correct. Finding the correct interpretation is, no doubt, a di fficu lt task, but only th at interpretation will enable us to be saved . So,
13 There is a tacit assumption at work in thi s line of thinking that migh t
be questioned. The assum ption is that it is in formation alone that is necessary

for salvatio n- i.c .. oncc one has all the information that is necessary for salvation then nothi ng else is necessary. But this is ques tionable. Latter-day Saints
claim that even if we know the "what"" and " how" of salvation we still need the
proper authority. Aut hority itself comes from God and so it would seem to require
some kind of revelation. Of course. this kind of revelatio n is not propositional
(i.e" informational) but rather performative, and hence would not be included in
a canon. So, il seems that the ex istcnce of this sort of continuing reve lation
would not imply that the canon is open.
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God would want to make it possible for us to ascertain the correct
imerpretat ion. One way that he could do this is to give us furt he r
revelat ion (which might subsequently be canonized as new scripture) that cou ld he lp us to know the correct interpretations (e.g.,
that to be salvifically efficac ious baptism must be by immersion
a nd must be performed by someone with the proper aut hority).
To be sure, new scripture itself might require interpretation and
hence the need for a li ving prophet and, as needed. ongoi ng revelation. Otherwise, our scriptural understanding becomes merel y
scribal and without authority. Joseph Smith' s first vision came in
response to his prayerful petition for divine help when he fo und
he could not settle opposing doctrina l claims by an appeal to the
Bibl e. since proponents of the opposing claims all professed bibli cal warrant fo r the ir position, but each understood the same verses
differently. A striking case in point is the failure of biblical scholars to come to consensus on the meaning of Paul's reference to
baptism for the dead in I Corin thians 15:29. According to B. M.
Foschini the re are at least forty different interpretations of this
verse. 14 How great the need then for a living prophet who can
authoritati ve ly declare, "Thus sait h the Lord :'
Owen and Mosser conti nue Blomberg's defense of a closed
ca non based on the three criteria of apostol ic ity, agreement with
prev ious scripture, and widespread use in the churches (see O&M,
10-11). They are not impressed with Robinson 's claim that the
LDS scri ptures are apostolic in character, since thi s seems to expand the definition of apostolic. So, what is their definition of apostolic? They explain : "W hen Evangelicals speak of an apostolic
person or writing they are referring to the foundational apostles of
the first century" (O&M, I I). But, of course, with this de finiti on,
the insistence that scriptu re be apostolic begs the question in the
debate about whether the canon is closed. Of cou rse the canon is
closed if anyone who might have comributed to it is long since
dead. But why shoul d we think that only the apostles of the first
century could receive revelation fro m God? This is just anot her
form of the question as to why the canon should be closed.

14 See B. M. Foschini , "·Those Who Are Baptized for the Dead: 1 Cor.
15:29: An E)(egetical Historical Dissertation." Catholic Bibll! QIIDrt€rly 12
(1950): 260-76. 379-88; 13 (1951): 46-78. 172- 98,276-83.
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An additional argument given by Owen and Mosser for the
closed canOl! is

whallllt~y

call lhl; "auvent argument." The basic

idea is that after the closing of the Old Testament canon there was
to be no new revelation until the advenl of Christ. So, when Malachi points to the coming of the Messiah he is pointing to the next
event in "salvation history." Bul Ihen. by analogy. when the
Revelation of John points to the second advent of Christ (see
Revelation 22:12,20), it is also pointing 10 the next event in "salvation history." And since Owen and Mosser argue that Malachi
has established God's pauern of revelation (see O&M. 14-15), we
can assume that there will be no further revelation from God unlil
the second coming.
Owen and Mosser anticipate one Mormon response. In a footnote they say "We can only speculate how Latter-day Saint scholars might respond to this line of reasoning. We suspect they would
simply deny that the spirit of prophecy was inactive during
the intertestamental time" (O&M. 16 n. 27). This is exactly whal
Latter-day Saints should do. since the descendants of Lehi in
America continued to receive revelation during this time. And it is
not clear from what Malachi says (about John the Baptist and
Jesus) that there cannot be revelation given after his work and before the advent of Christ-such a conclusion would only seem to
follow if one admits. with Owen and Mosser. that with the close of
the Old Testament dispensation comes a silence from God. Why
should believers in the Book of Mormon buy such a thesis? So.
the advent argument also seems to beg the question.
Another problem with the advent argument is that the argument hinges on an analogy between Malachi and Revelation. This
analogy can hold only if Revelation was the last written document
of the New Testament. Yet, Elwell and De Young in the Evangelical Commentary on the Bible seem to admit the possibility that
Revelation was written before the Epistles of John.IS Should the
claim that the canon is effectively closed hinge on tenuous textual
dating techniques?
A final problem with the advent argument is that there is
revelation (e.g., the annunciation) that precedes the advent of

15 Sec Walter A. Elwell, cd .. Evangelical Commentary on the Bible (Grand
Rapids. Mich.: Baker Book House, 1989), 1177, 1197.
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Ch ri st and is preparatory to his co min g. Latter-day Saints claim
that modern-day reve lati on is similarl y preparatory for Jesus' second advent. Owen and Mosser mi ght assert that the two situati ons
are disanal ogous in that pre-fIrst-ad ve nt revelation immed iate ly
proceeded Chrisl's appearance while the LDS pre- seco nd-advent
revelation preceded Christ's appearance by a muc h longer period
of lime. Indeed, we are still waiting fo r that second advent. It is
difficu lt, though, to see how such disanalogy mailers. God's and
man's timetables have always been oul of sync. The earliest
Chri stians apparently expected Christ's second advent in their own
Iifetimes, 16
Although, as we have seen, the burden of persuasion rests with
those who would argue that the canon is closed, we still mi ght
make some Bible-based arguments for the claim that the canon is
open. One such argument could be based on John 14:26: " But
the Comforter, which is the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will se nd
in my name, he shall teach you all things, and bring all things to
your re membrance, whatsoever I have said unto you."
On its face, this passage indicates that even after Jesus is go ne
the Comfort er will come to teach the Saints "a ll thin gs." Thi s
would seem to indicate that revelation will continue, even after the
ascensio n of Christ. Indeed, the Comforter's bringing to the
Saints' remembrance all that Christ has taught them does not seem
equivalent to his teaching them all things since the relevant clauses
are conjoined by an and and not a that is or some suc h locution.
Of course, this is not how believers in a closed canon read this passage. They go out of their way to make the poi nt that thi s passage

16 Owen and Mosser might nnd a second disanalogy between the two
situations. Laue r-day Saints have already "canonized" the modem pre-second·
advent revelations before Jesus' arrival, whereas the reve lations given to Mary
and others before Jesus' birth were not recorded and canonized until much later.
This issue is relevant because, strictly speaking, it is the issue of an open canOl!
that is under discussion and not the issue of whether there is continuing revela·
tion. To be sure. the issues arc related, but the presence or communication be·
\ween God and humans does nOi establish that the record of this communication
could have been recorded and made canon before Jesus' advent. Nevertheless, at
least the possibility of revelation before the advent seems to weaken the adven t
argument against an open canon. And it does suggest that there can be (;ontinuing revel:ltion before the second advent.
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does 1101 support the idea of continu ing new revelation. For example. Sanders says,
The teaching which Jesus has given duri ng his
ministry on eart h is to be continued by the Paracle le.
se nt in his name (i .e. as his representative, cf. xiv. 14)
who will gua rantee that il is re membered and understood. but willnOl add any new revelation of his own
(cf. xvi. 13 r.), since that given in Jesus is comp lete
(cr. xiv. 9),17

John 16: 13, c ited as ev idence for the claim that the Paraelele will
add no new informatio n, says: " Howbe it when he, the Spirit of
truth. is come, he will guide you into all truth : for he shall not
speak of himself; but whatsoever he shall hear, that shall he speak:
and he will shew you things to come,"
Now strictly speaking this does not say that the Spirit will not
teach anything new . Rather, it says that he will not teach any th ing
of his own accord-it will a ll come from Christ. But this does not
e nta il that he will not teach a nythin g new unless we assume that
Chri st will have nothi ng new to teach us. And it is thi s very assumption that is in question in the debate about the open cano n.
Without thi s assumptio n (which we cannOI make with out begging
the question) this scripture seems to imply that new revelation is
possi ble.
One possible reply to ou r argume nt is based on John 14:9:
"Jesus saith unto him , Have I been so long time wi th you, and ye t
hast thou not known InC, Phillip? he that hath seen me hath seen
the Fat her; and how sayest thou then, Shew us the Father?" He re
Jesus seems to indicate that he is the full est revelat io n of God {Q
man . There is no difference between seei ng the Father and th e
Son. Does that entail thaI he can not go o n to teach us more ? T o
assume that it does is to assume that Jesus' reve lation during his
first earthly mini.\"try is all there is to hi s revelati on. But thi s is no t
so. There will be a second advent. And we can assu me that Jesus'
revelation of God in Ihi s second adve nt wi ll not be superfl uous.

17 Joseph N. Sanden. A CO/n/nt>nlo,y 011 lire Gospel according 10 John.
cd. 11. A. Mastin (New York: Harper & Row. 1968).333. e mphasis added.
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Admittedly thi s biblical exeges is proves neither the existence
of continuing revelation nor the possibility of an open canon. Yet,
it seems clear that without the assumption that there can be no
continuin g revelation as a guide in interpreting John 14:26, thi s
scripture seems to indicate that there can be continuin g reve lation
that will add to our understand ing.

Biblical Inerrancy
The next sc riptural issue addressed is biblical inerrancy. Owen
and Mosser express much satisfaction with Robinson's view on the
inerrancy of scripture. They do. however, point out an apparent
tension between Robinson's commitme nt to inerrancy and his
view of revelation (see O&M, 20). Robinson's view of revelation is
one in whic h revelation is primarily an experience on the part of a
prophet with God (see How Wide the Divide? 57-59; hereafter
HWO). Thi s experience is then recorded in what may become
scripture. The experie nce is immediate revelation; the written record is mediated revelation (see HWD, 57). The problem. we take it,
that Owen and Mosser see comi ng from this view of revelation is
that there is no reason to think that the record will be entirely accurate. This is because the revelation is not ve rball y insp ired (see
HWD, 56). The words are not God's words but the prophet's
words. And the prophet is human and fallible. We believe this is a
real problem that Robinson mu st deal with. The main question is
what the "mediacy" of the written record is supposed to be. Perhaps the written record is considered mediated not because some
of what it claims is false but because its manner of expression
is the prophet's and not God's. The prophet's manner of ex pression might be less precise than God's and yet still be entirely
correct. The lack of precis ion in the manner of expression does
not preclude veri simi litude in what is expressed. So, the mere fact
that the words are not God's does not impl y that they are not
correcl. 18
18 Another tactic in dealing with this problem would be to argue that not
only docs God put thc ideas in the mind of the prophet but he also supplies the
manner of expression of those ideas. But this seems to abandon the very position to be defended, since it is to effectively claim that the written scripture is
unmediated revelation. Robinson seems to want to avoid such a position: ''TIle
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Robinson advocates a view of the Joseph Smith Translation of
the Bible that den ies that its sole purpose is to restore the origina l
anc ient text (see HWD. 63). The apparen t reason fo r Ihis view,
accord ing to Owen and Mosser, is that it allows Latter-day Sainls
to avoid the criticism of Smith's prophetic call ing based on the
fac l that there is little evide nce that S mith 's changes restore or iginal text. Rob in son believes that Smith's changes include bot h
changes to the original text as well as restorations of the o ri gina l
tex t (see HWD.64). O ne purpose for these changes is to incl ude
plain and precious truths that have been lost nOl because of c ut ting from the texts we do have but because of the excl usio n of
texts from the corpus. For Owen and Mosser thi s seems to be an
ad hoc so lution to the prob lem. The prob lem, they seem to think,
is that this eli minates the JST as a piece of evidence with which to
check the accuracy of Joseph Smith's translating abili ties.
However, we don't see how thi s is a necessarily ad hoc so lution to the problem. First, it is not clear that we shou ld on ly accept
claims made about the JST in the event that these claims are in
some way verifiable or falsifiab le by "advances in the discovery
and study of anc ient manuscripts" (O&M, 23). Th is cl aim smacks
of positivism and would certain ly come back to undercut the
evangelical's pos ition insofar as it is committed to a view of the
Bible that is hardly verifiable or fa lsifiab le by current scholarl y
methods of biblical inqu iry. And there is cena in ly no logical in consistency in the claim that some of the JST is a restoration of
anc ient text and much of it is not. Perhaps Owen and Mosser
mean to suggest that thi s is some son of methodo logical or pract ical inconsistency, but they fa il to explai n what th is would be.
Second, there seems to be some independe nt reason for
thinking that the JST is not a literal restorat io n of the origin al a nc ie nt text. Indeed, Joseph himself may have had a broader view of
authorship than we do, and we would need to take th is into account when we read hi s clai ms that it is a "translatio n. " Indeed,
this is exact ly what Ph illi p Barlow argues in hi s book Mormons
direct revel3lion to a prophet or an apostle is immediate and primary. and this is
the word of God in the purest sense--a.s word and hearing rather than as lexl.
However, the recording. transmission and intcrprelation of the word depend on
fallible human bei ngs. using the fallib le human tools of reason and language"
(Ii WD.57).
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and the Bible,I9 He claims that it was widespread practice in the
earl y ninetee nth cen tury for later writers to make additions to a n
author's corpus, He says, "N umerous e~amples from the e ight·
eenth and nineteenth centuries would show that editorial tampe ring was frequent, that what we now think of as plagiarism was a
fairl y widespread practice,"20
And he points out that Dean Jessee has shown that Joseph
Smith partic ipaled in this common editorial practice. 21 Couple
this with Joseph's belief in hi s own prophetic calling, and it is not
hard to see how Joseph might have felt thal he cou ld make any
e mendations 10 the texl, even if they were not part of the ori gina l,
and yet call the resu lt a "t ran slati on." Indeed, whatever emendations he would make would be insp ired of God. And scripture is
the word of God. To further bolster this case, Barlow points out
that such a practice was not uncommon among the ancients. 22
Indeed, "Dav id is spoken of as author of the Psalms, and Moses as
author of the Pentateuch, even though parts of these works were
composed many hundreds of years after the trad itional author' s
death . "23 Barlow conc ludes by saying.

Joseph Smith , like many of the biblical writers, felt
he had received revelation and inspirat ion from God.
With hi s broad sense of authorship and his strong sense
of prophetic license, he felt the authority- indeed, the
ca lling- to inculcate his in sights into his revision of
scripture, much as prophetic writers in ancient times
had done. 24
In light of thi s argume nt. Robinson's theory of the JST seems
hardly ad hoc.

19 Scc Phi llip Barlow, Mormons and Ihe Bible: The Place aflhe Laller·day
Soinls ill America,1 Religion (Ne w York.: Oxford Uni ve rsity Press, 1991),

20 Ibid" 59.
21 Sec Dean C. Jessec, "The Reliability of Jo~cph Smith's History," JOllr·
1101 o{ Morm on Hi.flory 3 (1976): 23-46.
2 Sce Barlow, Mormons anti Ihe Bible, 6 1.
23 Raymond E. Brown, The Gospel according 10 Joll1l, Anchor Bible
Series. vol. 29 (Garden City. N.Y.: Doubleday. \966). \)(."()(vii.
24 Barlow, Mormons and Ille Bible, 61.
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Nevertheless. we believe Ihat II is proper for Owen and Mosser
to be worried about Robin son's theory. But the proble m is not
that it is ad hoc but thai it mig ht run into trouble with Robinso n's
commitment to the inerrancy of the Bible. Indeed, some of the
changes made by Joseph S mith change the propositional conte nt
of the Bible entirely. For example. in stead of Nathan tclling David
that he has been forgiven of God for hi s sins (as the KJV reads), in
the JST Nathan te ll s him thai he has not been forg iven. How mu sl
Robin son deal with such revisions? Suppose that they are taken to
be not restorations of the original. but e mendat ion s of the original
to accord with true doctrine. Thi s would imply the falsity of
claims made by the original text, thus impl yi ng the fal sit y of bib lical inerrancy. So, they must be restorations of the orig inal text,
according to Robin son's view. But then this is whe re the previous
problem raised by Owen and Mosser arises again. Is there evidence for these c hanges? Is there ev idence that o ne of the sc ribes
si mpl y dropped the "not" from the origi nal text? If not- and in
this case it seems that the ev idence points the other way-then
Robinson has not solved the problem that his theory of the JST
was meant to solve. Here we suggest that Rob inson abandon the
claim of biblical inerrancy-but, of course, thi s would mak e th e
divide wider.
Owen and Mosser claim that Robinson's view about the JST is
methodologically inconsistent with his rejection of an expansioni st
view of the Book of Mormon (see O&M, 23). At least. Robinson
docs owe us an ex planati on as to why such a loose understa ndin g
of translation can be applied to Joseph's translati on of the JST
and a muc h more strict unde rstanding mllst be appli ed to his
translation of the Book of Mormon. As it turn s out there is ev idence for a muc h mo re litera l translation of the Book of Mormon. 25 Un like the case of the JST, Jose ph Smith translated from
an actual text in the case of the Book of Mormon. And so, it
seems that there is reason to think that the JST is tran slated loosely
and the Book of Mormon was translated .~trjctly. The re is nothing
(even methodologically) incons istent in such an assertion. However, Robinson see ms to claim that an expansionist view of the
25 See Royal Skousen. "How Joseph Smith Translated the Book of
Mormon: Evidence from the Original Manusc ript:' iorlrlwl of Book of MOrlllOl1
Sill/lies 711 ( 1998): 23- 31.
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translation of the Book of Mormon is in principle unorthodox
and not just a view that fails to match up to the facts. 26 Perhaps
thi s is what Owen and Mosser believe counts as meth odo log ical
inconsistency.

The Nature of God
Divine Finitude
Owen and Mosser challenge Robin son and other Latte r-day
Sai nts on the issue of the poss ible finitude of God. Indeed, in their
final conclusion they iden tify four fundamental aspects of contemporary LDS theology, which they maintain remain "out s id e
the boundary of Christian orthodoxy." The first is a " th eo log icall y2? unacceptable form of finite theism" (O&M. 81). However,
Robi nson ex plic itly repudiates the allegation that Mormon theism
is finiti stic, claiming that Latter-day Sai nts, like evangelicals, un derstand God to be "om niscient , omnipotent, omnipresent, infi nite, eternal, and unchangeable" (HWD, 77). This list of divine attributes is very unlikel y to cause the average Lauer-day Saint any
consternation and, indeed, each can be found in unique ly LDS
scri pture. The difference between Latter-day Sa inls and evangelicals hinges not on the names of the attributes ascribed to God, but
on how they are best defined. 28 Owen and Mosser correctly poi nt
26 Indeed. Robinson says that the upansionist view of the Book of
Mormon is a "camou Oagcd capitulation to the arguments of the Church's opponents." 'The 'E:\panded' Book of Mormon'!" in Tile Book of Mormon: Second
Nl'phi. The Doc/rinal Structure, ed. Monte S. Ny man and Charles 0 , Tate Jr.
(Provo. Utah: BYU Religious Studies Center. 1989).413.
27 We think it significant that Owen and Mosser object to an LOS formulation of divine omnipotence on the ground that is /I!eologically as opposed to
biblically unacceptable. Indeed. the biblical writers never menlion the logical
modalities in which the traditional definitions are couchcd. These formulations
arc a product of ra tional theologizing, not revelation.
28 Perhaps Robinson is doing what is often done in LOS circles. Latterday Saints do commonly use these terms with an intended meaning differe nt than
those offered by traditional Christians. Since one of the fundamental purposcs of
How Wide Ihe Divide? is to eliminate prohlems of communication arising out of
our using the same terminology to express different ideas. for Robinson to make
the above claim without further clarification seems not in the spirit of the project- unless. of course, he does have the traditional definitions in mind.
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out Ihat a number of Latte r-day Sainls, incl ud ing Paulsen in his
1975 doctoral di ssertation, have described LOS theism as fini ti stic.
T hus they seem justified in raising the questi on. T he re are ma n y
issues here, and some are rather complex , but we will try to address as many of them as poss ible.
AI the outset, it is important to note that Paul sen no lo nger
uses the term fill ite nor its cognates to describe the LDS understandi ng of God. This is not because he thinks the term, when correctl y understood, is inapplicable to God, but because the term is
almost always misunderstood and because the term now see ms to
hi m to be rheloricall y inappropriate, even when correctl y understood. To understand this last point , we need to clarify how
Paulsen used the term. In his di sserlal ion, Paulsen defi nes 'finitism' as the cl aim that there are logically possible (i.e" not selfcontradictory) slales of affairs thai God cannol bring about-i.e ..
S isfillitel9 if and o nly if there exists a logicall y possible state of
affairs such that S cannot bring it abou t. 30 Trad it iona ll y speaking,
the claim that God is omnipotent has been unde rstood to mean
that he is not li mited in any substantive way. What this means has
been a matter of some disagreement . But there is general conse nsus about the mean ing of this among philosophers of reli gion.
The consensus is that th is means that God is subject to no no nlogical constra ints. So, God cou ld not create a round square, But
he could create a square of any possib le size. Being limited by
log ic is not really being li mited al all (or so the thin king goes)
since logical truth is conceptua l truth and not substanti ve truth- it
tell s us nothing about the way the world is, and so God is not li mited by anyth ing in the world . To state this idea prec isely, one
wou ld say that S is omnipotentr31 if and onl y if S can bri ng abou t
any logically poss ible state of affairs. To put this in terms of the
now popul ar "possible world s" o ntology: S is o mni pote nt T if and
only if for any possible world w, S can make wactual. Notice that
if God is omni potent T then he is not fi nitep-given Pau lsen's
defi nit io n.

29

Fin ilcp refers to Paulsen's stipulated definition of filii Ie.

30 See David L. Paulsen. "Comparative Coherency of Mormon (Finitistic)
and Classical T heism" (Ph.D. diss .. University of Michigan. 1975).93 .
3 1 The subscript T stands for thc traditional definition of omnipotence.
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However, there have been other ways of constru ing the trad itional notion of omnipote nce. For instance, in order to ma ke his
free-w ill defense work, Alvin Plantinga clai ms that even th ough
God is omni potent, he cannot make j ust any possible world actual,
si nce in some possible worlds we make free choices. And it is a
conceptual contradict ion to say that God cou ld "ensure" that we
freely choose to act in a certai n way. One's free choice is, by definition, something that is in one's own control and not in anyo ne
else's, not even God's. So, Plantinga ack nowledges that God, even
though omnipotent, cannot bring about j ust any log icall y poss ible
world-for example, he can not bring abou t a world in which pe rsons always freely choose the right, even though such a world is
logica lly possible. Rather, he argues that the claim that God is omnipotent should be understood as Ihe claim Ihat God can bring
abou t any possib le world Ihat is logicall y poss ible for him to
bring about. In other words, S is omnipotent A if and onl y if Scan
bring about any world w such that S's bringing aboul w involves
no log ica l contrad iction.32
Although Planti nga's defin ition of omn ipotence verbally di ffers on ly sli ght ly from the traditional defi nition, this diffe re nce,
su bstantively speaking, is very signi ficant. Indeed, on Pla ntinga's
definition God can be both omnipotent and fini te". From an LDS
point of view, it is also signi ficant that Plantinga sees the free
choices of individuals as li miting the states of affairs that God ca n
bring about. Indeed, it is Ihi s very fea ture of his free-w ill defense
that makes it such a strong defense against the problem of ev il. We
would be interested to learn whether Owen and Mosser wou ld also
be inclined to accept Planti nga's understanding of omn ipotence.
32 Notice that Plantinga's poi nt entails that the Irllditional definition of
God's omnip<ltencc. captured in the definition of omnipolenceT. is inconsistent.
Indeed, it would be possible for God to bring about stales of affairs that only free
agents can bring about. And this is a contradiction. So. there is a very real sense
in which Plantinga's understanding of omnipotence is just an attempt to get at
the consistent core of the traditional unde rstanding that God is limi ted by logic
alone. See Alvi n Plantinga, The Nalure of NecessilY (Oxford: Clarendon. 1974),
164- 95. The subscript A indicates that this is Alvin Plantinga's definition of
omnipotence. For a more thorough attempt to refi ne the traditional notion of
omnipotence see Thomas P. Flint and Alfred J. Freddoso. "Maximal Power." in
The ExiSlence ond NO/ure of God. ed. Alfred J. Freddoso (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983).8 1-113.
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If so, Ihey too would have a finitistic conceplion of God-given
Paul sen 's technic,al definition of the term. If not, then we wou ld

be interested in seeing how they deal with the problem of moral
ev il- an issue that we discuss further below.)3
Neverthe less, either the more Iradilional or Plantinga 's way of
defining omnipotence leaves us with a formulation with which
most Latter-day Sainrs would be (or. at least, s hould be) un co mfortable . Clearly, Latter-day Sai nt s nol only believe (hal G od
can not create free agents wh ilst determining what it is they will
choose, bUI they also believe that he e ncounters other s ubstamive
limitalions as well. Both the ir belief in divine e mbodiment and
their denial of ex nihilo creat ion point to this. Lauer-day Sai nts
belie ve that God is embod ied . It is difficult to see how one could
define b ody without implying that God has certa in spatial and
temporal limitation s. 34 For e xample, an embod ied person is limited in the sense that he cannot be bodily present everywhere or at
everywhen. One might say that God 's body is non-essential to
him ; i.e., he could at any time "disembody" himse lf. But then
this would greatly minimize the LDS view of God and make it
hardl y different from the traditional Christian notion-si nce non LDS Chris tian s often affirm that God can at will take on or put off
bodily form. 35
33 We assume that with their preference for Arminianism ovcr Calvinism
Owen and Moss~r accept :l substan ti ve nOlion (Ii bcnarian?) of free will.
34 Indeed. if we define a body as the maner occupying some particu lar region of space. then. by df.,/inilion. that body cannot be in two reg ions of s pace
al one time. And being in two regions of space at one time is certainly logically
possible. Fo r the property of redness, if there ;s such a thing, can be :II two di ffere nt places :II one lime. And the belief thai there arc properties such as red ness
is ccrtainly not logically contradicto ry. even if it is fal se. Compare Gracc M.
Dyck (Jantzenl. "Omnipresence and Incorporeality:' Religious :iwdies 13
( 1977); 85-9 1.
35 Indeed. Robi nson seems to make a similar move when he claims that
"Goo has a body, bUI Goo's body docs nOI have him" (HWD. 88_89). Robinson
argues thai God can be omnipresent even if he has a body. The idea is that although God has a body hi s spi rit is everywhere present . But it is imponant to
remember that fo r Lauer-day Saints spi rit is mallcr (see D&C 13 1:7) and not
irnmilteri:ll. And so to say that God' s spirit is cvcrywherc is tant:lmount to saying that God is identifiable with material reali ty. This milkes Robi nson's position dilngerously close to pantheism---or. at least. pnne ntheism. The proof of
this is:ls follows; Suppose that God's spirit is in every spati otcmporal rcg io n ,
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Similarly, the LDS denia l of creation ex nihifo also makes a n
affi rmation of the traditiona l defi nition of omn ipotence unte nab le
for them. For it follows from the fac t that there a re uncreated (a nd
no ncreatabfe) entities, coeternal with God, that there are ma ny
log ica lly poss ible states of affairs that God cannot bri ng a bout
although his bringi ng them about would involve no logical co ntradict ion. B. H. Roberts clearly saw this implicati on of the LOS
denial of c reation ex nihilo and modified his notion of omn ipotence accord ingly. On his construal of omnipotence, Sis omll ipotent R just in case S can bri ng about any states of affairs consistent
with the nature of eternal existences. A broader definition of omnipotence and one that would be equivalent to Roberts ' s in the
LDS context is that S is omnipoten t,. just in case S can bring about
any state of affairs suc h that S's bri ngi ng it about is consistent
with the ontologica l structure of uncreate rea lity. Clearl y, a be ing
that is omnipotent p can also be finite p , but then so can a be ing that
is o mni po t ent ~ . So, we might give a more refined noti on of fi nitude as fo llows: S is fillite o if and onl y if there is a state of affai rs
A such that there is no log ical contradictio n invo lved in S's
bri nging about A but S can not bring abou t th at A. On this definition of finitude a being that is omni potent p and not omn i po t ent~ is
fi nite o. However, for reasons a lready noted, Pau lsen believes it
belle r to omit the term fillite and its cog nates in describing God's
om ni pote nce.
As Owen and Mosser poi m out, the idea that God is not omnipole nt T gives us an apparentl y easy so lution to the problem of
ev il (see O&M, 27 n. 50). However, the ir acceptance of Professor
Appleby's claim that suc h a solution "involves the curtail men t of
traditional claims about divi ne power, de nying om nipotence and
insisting that God has none of the miraculous powers attributed to
no matter how small. Since space-time is conti nuous. for every region in which
some of God's spirit is present :my proper part of tha t region has God's spir it.
Suppose that God is not materially idenlicallo the whole material universe. Then
there is some mailer that is nOI ide ntical with a part of God's spirh, and none of
whose parts arc identical to a part of God's spirit. Choose the most minimal region occupied by this mailer. No two material objects can occupy precisely the
same location, since a material object is, by definition. something that occupies
a particular location. So. God's spirit is not present in the chosen region. So, by
reductio, ifGod's spirit is literally present in every region of space then God's
spirit is identical with the material universe.
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him in Christian liternture"36 is a mistake. Appleby's reasoning
here is fallacious. God's not being omnipotenl T does not entail
thaI he cannot perform miracles-whether those miracles be construed as violations of natural laws or jusl a result of God's understanding and utilizing nalural Jaw in a way transcending human
ken.

Indeed. it would be fair to say that a God who is not OrnnipOle nt T could still be omnipotent in the biblical sense of the
term, where by this we might mean that God is supreme, havin g
power over all things so that no one or nothing can thwart the fulfillment of his purposes and promises. This is the implicit definilion given of 'omnipotence' in the Lectures on Faith}? Owen
and Mosser make the object ion that if God is omn ipotent in this
sense but not omnipotentT • then it is logically possible that there
cou ld be a being more powerful than God who cou ld thwart his
will. But thi s involves an equivocation of modalities. It is one thing
to say that given the way things are God can ensure the success of
his plan. and it is another thing to say that God cou ld e nsure his
plan no matter how things might have been. Surely if there were
an ev il umniputtmt T !xing, then Gut! cuuld nul ensure the fulfillment of his purposes and promises. But there is no suc h evil omnipotent being. nor cou ld there ever be one. God repeatedly tells
us in the scriptures that his promises are sure, and we should believe him. What matters is that God can and will fulfill all hi s purposes and promises in the actual world, not what could possibly be
imagined.
36 Peter C. Appleby. '·Finitist Theology and the Problem of Evil.·· in Line
Une: Essays on Monnon Doc/rine. ed. Gary Bergera (Salt Lake City: Signature Books, 1989), 87.
37 Compare Lecture 2. paragraph 2: "We here observe that God ;s the onty
supreme governor and independent being in whom all fulness and perfection
dwell. He is omnipotent. omnipresent. and omniscient. without beginning of
days or end of life·'; :md Lecture 4, paragraph 12. which explicates the prior
paragraph as follows: "For unless God had power over all things. and was able by
his power to control all things and thereby deliver his creatures who put their
trust in him from the power of all beings that might seck their destruction,
whether in heaven. on earth. or in hell. men cou ld not be saved. But with the idea
of the existence of this attribute planted in the mind. men who put their trust in
God feel as though they have nothing to fear. bel ieving that he has power to
save all who come !O him to the very uttermost."
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On the other hand. although the LOS understand ing of Ihe
nat ure of d ivine om nipotence gives us a clear way out of the
problem of ev il, it is far fro m clear Ihal evangelical theology does
the same.

Divine E mbodiment
On the LDS doctrine of divine embodi ment, Owen and Mosser
hedge a bit, h inting t hat they (or at least some evange licals) may
be open to the poss ibi lity of God's being in some sense embodied. It is significant here that they confi ne their reservations abou t
LDS belief to the claim that God the Father is embod ied, presumably findi ng unproblematic the embod iment of the Son. Consider the fo llowing: ( I) They acknow ledge, of course, that God the
Son was embodied in the person of Jesus of Nazareth and that he
continues to ex ist as a resurrected body although "by c hoice, not
by metaphys ical necessity" (O&M, 47 n. 105).38 (2) T hey co ncede that God the Father has "appeared" in the form of a man,
but hi s appearances should not be confused with what he is essentiall y. (3) They claim that if God the Fat her does have some
form of body, the n texts suc h as Ezekiel I :26- 28 and Daniel 7:9
seem to indicate that it is not a "body of fiesh and bones as lang ible as man's." Thus they conclude that "i t is not beyond orthodoxy to take the language o r Ezek iel I and Daniel 7 seriously
whi le con tinu ing to maintain the orthodox concept of God"
(O&M. 35). And, fi nally, (4) they opine that "some Lau e r-day
Saints may rig/Illy feel that Robinson jumps ship too quick ly" in
denying that there is any clear Old Testament support for the co ncept that God the Father is embodied (O&M, 35 n. 7 1, emphasis
added).
Now, Owen and Mosser explain the appearance or anthropomorphic language in the Bible by ack now ledgi ng that God can
take o n the form of a human body. But. they claim, this does not
imply that God is e mbod ied in the way that Latter-day Saints
c laim (see O&M, 32- 33). Yet it seems to us that it is just as co nsistent with the anthropomorph ic language of the Bible to claim
that God is embodied in a body of fiesh and bones. Indeed, a
38 Ir the Son can shed hi s resurrected body at any time he chooses. then
what is the point of his being resurrected?
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mo re natural and literal reading of the Bible leads us to the conclusion that God is e mbod ied in thi s way. However. we admit thai
it is the further revelation from the LOS ca non thai assures us that
thi s is the case.
Of course, the imporlant point here is whether the view that
God (the Father) is embodi ed is consiste nt with the Sible. Owen
and Mosser offer the class ic proof text for the claim thaI it is nol.
Jo hn 4:24 NIV says, "God is spirit. and his worshipers must
worship in spirit and truth ," In note 64, Owen and Mosser claim
that, cont rary 10 what Latter-day Sa ints bel ieve. the affirmatio n
that God is a spirit is not a predication of co mposi tion but an
essential predicat ion. Th eir argument is that Jesus' claim is g iven
in the contex t of the Sa maritan woman's q uery about her
ancestors worshiping on the mountain and the Jews worshiping in
Je rusalem. In o the r words. she is concerned about where she
should worship. Jesus answers by say ing that "God is spirit" and
hence implies that he has no location. This would seem to indicate,
Owen and Mosser claim, that Jesus is talking about God 's essence.
However, this read ing is not the onl y possible one. For in stance, Sanders argues:
That God is spirit is not meant as a definiti on of
God's being-though th is is how the Sto ics would have
understood it. It is a metaphor of his mode of
operation , as li fe-g iving power, and it is no more to be
taken litera lly than I Jo hn i. 5, "God is lig ht", or Deu!.
iv . 24, "Your God is a devouring fire" . It is onl y those
who have received this power through Christ who can
offer God a real worship.39
And so, if we may take the clai m that God is spirit as metaphorical and not essential predication then we can avoid the implication that this scripture is inconsistent with God's being embodied . Instead of reading Jesus' statement as say in g that it does no t
matter where you wOrlihip because God is not located, we sho uld
read it as say ing that it does not matter where you worship as long
as it is done in the right spirit and in truth.

39

Sanders. A Commentary 011 the Gospf'l (/ccorditlg to SI. Julm, \47-48.
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On the other hand, suppose that we do take the interpretation
of this passage by Owen and Mosser as the correct one, i.e., that
"God is a spirit" is an essential predication. Does it show that
God is an immaterial being? We think it does not. This is because
we think that there is evidence that the Greek word translated as
"s piri t"-i.e., pneuma- is not most naturally read as indicating
an immalerial substance.40 Indeed, one of the great advocates of
the immaterialism of God, Origen himself, thought that Joh n 4 :24
cou ld be construed as a proof text for the position he railed
against. He says,
I know that some will attempt to say that, even according to the declarations of our own Scriptures, God
is a body, because ... they find it said ... in the Gospel according to John, that "God is a spirit, and they
who worship Him must worship Him in spirit and
tru th." ... sp irit, according to them, lisJ to be regarded
as nothin g else than a body.41
It is s ignificant indeed that Origen thought he needed to respond to those who used John 4:24 to establish that God is a
body. If pneuma clearly referred to an immaterial substance, th en
such a response would be superfluous. And it is not j ust unsop hi sticated laymen who would have advocatcd the embodiment view as
based on a scripture like John 4:24. Indeed, Tertullian advocatcd
such a view and used John 4:24 in his defense. Tertullian claimed
that God was "a body, although 'God is a Spirit,'" for "Spi rit
has a bodily substance of its own ki nd."42 Clearly, th is indicates
that the more natural readi ng of John 4:24 would have implied
that God is embod ied-at least by the lights of some of the ea rl y
chu rch fathers. We should be skeptical about the use of John 4:24
to support the immalerialist position. Wolfson agrees with this
understanding of how the chu rch fathers would have understood

40 For more on this see part 2 of David L. Paulsen, 'The Doctrine of Di·
vine Embodiment: Restoration, Judeo·Christi:m, and Philo~ophical Perspectives," nyu Studies 35/4 (1995- 96): 6-94.
41 Origen. De Principiis 1.1, in Tire Ante-Nicene Fatlrers (hereafter ANf).
cd. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans,
195 1), 4:242,
42 Tcrtullian, Against Praxeas 7, in ANF. 3:602.
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such a passage, and he even concludes that the immaterialist un ·
derstanding of the passage is unfounded . He says, "ill Scripture
. .. there is no indication that by spirit and soul were meant any
such principles as form or immateriality,"4 3

Deification
If there is any aspect on which one might think the divide
between Latter-day Saints and evangelicals would be very wide
indeed it would be on the LOS doctrine that man can become as
God is. Bul surprisingly the divide does not seem so wide given
Robinson's reading of LDS theology . He talks about the "official
doctrine of the Church on deification" as being no more and no
less than what is taught in the Bible and the Doctrine and Covenants. Of course, the question is how these passages should be interpreted . Robinson claims that
Those who are exalted by [God's) grace will always be
"gods" (always with a small g, even in the Doctrine
and Covenants) by grace, by an extension of his power,
and will always be subordinate to the Godhead. In the
Greek philosophical sense-and in the "orthodox"
theological sense-such contingent beings would not
even rightly be called "gods," since they never become "the ground of all being" and are forever subordinate to their Father. Any teaching beyond this involves speculation without support from either the
Bible or the other LOS scriptures, and these are waters I
refuse to swim in. (HWD, 86)
Robinson seems to be making several claims about the LOS
doctrine of deification, and thus about how we should interpret the
passages in the scriptures to which he refers. Here are some of the
claims he makes:
I. Those who are exalted are gods and not Gods, where the
lowercase g seems to indicate an ontological and not merely a
qualitative difference.
43 Harry A. Wolfson. Philo: FoundDlions 0/ Religious Philosophy in Judaism. Chris/iani/),. and Islam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1948) .
2 :95 .
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2, Those who are exalted are gods by grace and by extension
of the power of God.
3. Those who are exalted. and thus gods, will always be subordinate to the Godhead.
4 . Those who will be gods are not gods in any sense that
would be recognized by traditional Christians or philosophers.
5. Those who will be gods are co ntin ge nt beings. (We can
on ly suppose that by 'contin gent ' Robinson has the traditi onal
philosophical notion in mind. )
6. God is the ground of all being.
Now we assert that all but two of these claims are interpretations of the cited scriptures that are, at least, subject to question;
and one of the remaining two is quite misleading although stric tl y
speaking true. Thus, far from avoiding speculation about
deification, Robinson speculates and does so in a way that makes
his theory more likely to be fal se than not. Our argument contra
Robinson here relies on the fact that he accepts Joseph Smith's
"King Follett Di scourse" (KFD)44 as, in part, defi niti ve of the
LDS view of deification . Indeed, he accepts it as "quas i-official "
and, de facto, equally as determining of LDS doctrine on this
mailer as the canon (HWD , 85- 86).
Regarding the first point, the most widely circulated version of
the KFD claims that we have to learn 10 become "Gods" ourselves, and that is God with a capital C.45 Apparently Jose ph
Fielding Smith, the compiler of thi s ve rsion of Joseph 's famous
44 See Joseph Smith. " King Follen Discourse," in Teachings of the
Prophet JOStl,h Smith (S:llt Lake City: Deseret Book. 1997),342- 55.
45 Ibid., 346. This el:lim is :llso true of most other versions of the discourse. Indeed. the Bullock version says. "you have got to learn to be a God
yourself': the Larson version says, "You have got to learn how to make yourselves Gods": the WlXXlruff version says, "And you have got to learn to make
yourselves God"; and the Richards version says, "you have got to know how to
make you rsetves Gods." It is ont y the Clayton ve rsion that differs: "You have
got to learn to be a god yourself in order to save yourself- to be preists Isic] and
kings as alJ Gods has Isiel done." These quotations are from The Prophet Joseph
Smith's King Follell Discourse: A Six-Column Comparison of Original Notes
and Amalgamations, eomp. Donald Cannon and Larry Dahl (Provo, Utah: BYU
Religious Studies Center, 1983), 30-31. Clearly. the textual evidence supports
the claim that Joseph did not ma ke a nominal disti nction between Gods and
gOlls.
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sermon, did not find it necessary [0 draw the no minal dis tinct ion
so as to poim 10 some fundam enta l ontological disti nct io n, as
Robinson see ms to want to do. Of course, thi s mi gh t just be an
acc ident of no menclature if it were not the case that the KFD did
not make it clear that there is no on to logical distinclion between
God and Man. Cons ider, for exa mple, the following quotes:

Here, then, is eternal lifc- to know the only wise
and true God; and you have got to learn how to be

Gods yourselves, and to be kings and priests

10

God.

the same as all Gods have done before you .46
To inherit the same power, the same glory and the
same exa ltation. until you arrive at the stati on of a
God. 47

It is the first principle of the Gospel to know for a certainty the Characte r of God, and to know that we may
converse with him as one man converses with another,
and that he was once a man like us; yea, that God himself, the Father of us all, dwelt on an eardL 48
We say that God himse lf is a se lf-ex isten t be ing.
Who la Id you so? It is correct enough; hUI how did it
get in to your heads? Who told you that man did not
exist in like manner upon the same principles? Man
does ex ist upon the samc princ iples .49
The first tells us that we will be the same as all the Gods befo re
us. O ne wou ld be hard prcssed to claim thaI this allows for an onto logica l d istinction between us and those Gods. The second tells
us that we inherit the same power, glory, and exa ltation as God.
T he third clearly puts God in a position simi lar to ours (or at least
Jesus') at some po int in the past. Again, the relationship between
us and God seems to be more like that of a literal fath e r to his
c hild than of one on to log ica l category to another. The fmal quotation explicitly claims that man is sel f-ex is te nt in the same way
Smith. "King Follett Discourse." 346.
47 tbid., 347.
48 Ibid., )45-46.
49 Ibid .. 352 .
46
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that God is. If by 'self-exi stent ' Joseph means something like
"bei ng the reason and ground for its own existence," then this
clearly implies that man is just as ontologicall y fundam ental as
God. The difference betwee n God and us, then, is a matter of degree and not of ontological category.
Second , we are exalted by grace and by the extension of the
power of God. Thi s seems basically correct so long as one understands the necessity of man 's cooperative effort in the process.
For instance, Joseph says that "you have got to learn how to be
Gods you rselves."SO And this seemingly implies that we must do
some of the work. Moreover, say ing that we arrive at the station of
a God seems to imply not that we participate in God's station as a
God, but that we have our own stat ion of Godhood. At the very
least, it is difficult to see where the idea of participation in God's
power co mes from in the scriptures. It does not see m to be in
Doctrine and Covenants 132: 19- 20 either. Is Robinson participating in the speculation that he tries to avoid?
The third point is correct. KFD says that after Jesus (and we
ourselves) take the throne of eternal power, "(God, the Father /
will then take a higher exaltation, and [JesusJ will take hi s place,
and thereby become exalted [him se lf/. "51 Clearly, our progression to God hood will never allow us to "catch up" to God the
Father in power. Of course, the claim of subord ination to the
Father's glory here seems to imply the doctrine of eternal progression, which in turn imp lies that God can progress further in
glory. Moreover, since the KFD clearl y implies that in the future
we can become as God is now, thi s claim of eternal subordinatio n
implies that God will progress beyond where he is now, i.e. , God is
surpassable (at least by himself) .
The fourth item on the list is a strange claim for Robinson to
make. It seems that Robi nson usuall y does not like the influence
of Greek philosophy on traditional theology. But here he poims
out that the kind of gods that we would become wou ld not count
as gods according to the Gree k conception. This is probably right,
if by 'Greek conception of God' he means something like the
unmoved mover of Aristotle. or the Form of the Good for Plato.

50
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Ibid .. 346.
Ibid .. 348.
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But, of course, the traditional Christian God is neither of these
things either. It is also true that we can not be gods in the sense of
the traditional C hri st ian God, if by that Robinson means something like the Anselmian notion of God. BUI thi s seems hard ly
relevant, since by LDS li ghts God the Father is not a God on the
Anselmian notion of God.
Surely in one sense il is true to say thai the Gods that we can
become will remain cont ingent. For a Siale of affairs is contingent
just in case it could have failed to ex ist. 52 And the slate of affairs
of our attaining Godhood could surely have failed to exist. However, there is another sense of cOnlingency in whic h x is said to be
contingent just in case there is a y upo n which x's ex istence depends. If thi s is what Rob inson means by sayi ng that we will be
contingent, then he is wrong. As we have already seen, Joseph says
in the KFD. "We say that God himself is a self-ex istent being .
. . . Man does ex ist upon th e same principles."53 Clearl y, 'selfexistent' is most plausibly read as implying that his ex istence does
not depend on anything else. Given this definition of 'con tin gent', it follows thai we are not contingent.
That Robinson is commi tted to the sixth claim is implied by
his reason for believ ing the fourth. We cannot become Gods in th e
Greek sense (whatever thai is) since we cannot be the ground of all
being. But certa inl y God the Father is also not the ground of all
being. Indeed, to say that S is the ground of all being is to say that
everything that exists depends ontologically on S's existence. A nd
again the KFD claims that this is false. There it is quite clear that
Joseph is denying ex nihilo creatio n, affi rming the independent
ex istence of matter and the independent ex istence of our intelligence (or the fundamental part of us that makes us who we are).
These claims are also affirmed in Doctrine and Covenants 93 and
131.
So, it might be fai r to say that the divide is as wide here as o ne
might expect it to be, and nO( as narrow as Robinson claims. However, Robinson does commit himself to a doctrine of deificatio n
that is at least as st rong as that advocated by Greek Orthodox
theology, and it is thi s doctrine that Owen and Mosser criticize.
52 Compare A. Plantinga. Nature of Necessity? I. and Flint and Freddoso,
"Maximal Power," 87.
53 Smith. "King Follett Discourse," 352.
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Note that if they are ri ght to criticize a very minimal version of
deification, then their arguments will probably apply to a more
pronounced version, a fortiori.
The fi rst argument that Owen and Mosser offer against the
doctrine of deification is that ad vocates of such a doctrine tend to
confuse justification with sanctification. Apparently the idea is that
the doctrine of deificat ion essentiall y claims that sa lvation is becomi ng like God . And so, si nce the fo rgiveness of sins is part of
salvation, justification is brought about merely by this becoming
as God is. However, this practically ide ntifies justification (bei ng
forgiven or acquitted of sin) and sanctification (beco ming holy).
From an evange lical perspecti ve this identification is wrong. For
one thing, it tends to lead to the view that justification requires
works and is not by grace alone. This is a point that Owen and
Mosser take up later.
Of course, this argu ment is not really an argument that is
supposed to convi nce Latter-day Saints or Greek Orth odox that
the doctrine of deification is wrong. It is more an argument that is
supposed to convince someone who is evangelical that the
doctrine of deification is unacceptable. The arsument serves to
show where a difference lies, but we can hardly see that it shows
where a superiority lies . Indeed, who is to say that justification and
sanctification are not very closely related in Ihe way Latter-day
Sa ints. Catholics, and Orthodox believers say they are? Owen and
Mosser might cite Pau l in answer to this question. But then we
have the old debate about which soteriology is best supported by
the New Testament as a whole, and we' ll leave that 10 a bit laler.
Robin son argues that "t he soil from which the LOS doctrine
of deification grows is the belief that humans are of the divine
species and that the scriptural language of divine paternity is not
merely figurati ve" (HWO, 82). Owen and Mosser respond by
pointing oul that the passages thai Robinson cites in defense of
our divine herilage will only be conv incing to those who come to
the Old Testament with the assumption of divine paternity already
in hand (see O&M, 42). This may be ri ght. The tu quoque reply is
that the same app lies to the claim that such passages are meant
onl y to be fi gurati ve. But a Lauer-day Sain t may also argue that
the presumption is in favor of the literal interpretation of such
passages. After alL in prose there is always an assumption that
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what is staled is to be taken li terall y unle!i"s there ;s an indicator
otherwise. Owen and Mosser owe us more than the claim that such
passages could be interpreted figufal ive ly; they need to argue th at
suc h passages should be interpreted figurative ly.
They do try 10 give us such an argume nt by appeali ng to
Genes is 2:7 NIV: "God for med the man fro m the d ust." Supposed ly. thi s implies that there is an o ntologica l chasm between
God and man.
It should be clear that the mere fact that God fo rmed man out
of the dust of the earth docs not imply that man is not the same
kind of be ing as God, i.e., o n an onto logical conti nuum with God.
S uch a clai m would assu me that nothing ca n ma ke o the rs of its
own kind. And procreation (not to mention cl oning!) shows this
assumption to be patently fa lse .
However, they may be claiming more narrow ly that anyt hing
that is created can not be like God in the se nse of be ing se lfex istent and uncreated. Thi s appears to be a necessary tru th . However, th e critical question is exactly what God c reated out of th c
dust of the gro und. Presumably, on ly man's body. Wc don't believe that Owen and Mosser wou ld affi rm that man's spirit was
created out of dust. And it is man's spirit thal Joseph said is cocternal with God, unc reatcd, and sc lf-ex istent. Thus, fo r the reasons given, it does not appear that Genes is 2:7 is in any way inconsistent with the Mormon doctrine of dc ifica tion.

Trinity
Robinson rig htly ex.presses Mormon be lief abou t the Godhead
in the following way: "We believe that the oneness of these three
is not an ontological oneness of be ing ...• but a o neness of mi nd,
purpose, power and intent" (HWD, 129). By thi s view, Latter-day
Saints affi rm whal Owen and Mosser call the "economic t ri nity"
and deny what they call the "ontolog ical tri nity." Owen a nd
Mosse r argue that there is scriptural evidence for the ontological
oneness of God, and they fault Lattcr-day Sa inls fo r deny ing this
aspect of Christi an orthodoxy.
Clearly, as Owen and Mosser poi nt oul (see O&M, 45). the
Hebrcw tradi tion was monotheistic: "Hear, 0 Israe l: the Lord our
God, the Lord is onc" (Deuteronomy 6:4 NIV). C learl y refe rring
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to thi s Old Testament claim, however, Paul makes the radical
remark "For us there is but one God, the Father ... and there is
but one Lord, Jesus Christ." It seems that he is say ing that there is
one God and then there is also one Lord (where both God and
LQrd are di vine titles). No wonder Jews and Muslims accuse
Christians of compromising monotheism. Of course, claims like
that found in Deuteronomy 6:4 and in Paul are together the reason for classic Trinitarianism. Indeed, if you assume an ontological interpretation of Deuteronomy 6:4 then Trinitarianism (o r
something like it) seems the only way to reconcile monist claims
about God with the pluralist claims about divine persons. But why
should one make such assumptions? Paul seems to be say ing that
God is a designator of the Father. And clearly since there is but
one Father, there is but one God in this sense. Why should we
make the assumption that Paul must mean here that God the
Father and the Lord Jesus Christ are the same being or substance?
Owen and Mosser give a theologica l argument that the Son
must be the same Deity as the Father (if not the same person):
"U nless the Son is the true God, as opposed to some lesser or independent Deity, then redemption is dependent on a being who is
unable to effect true reco nciliati on with the Deity" (O&M, 49).
This raises several issues. First is the issue about whether Latterday Saints affirm that the Son is a lesser or independent Deity.
And we will take this up shortly . Second, the reasoning seems sp urious. Owen and Mosser's claim is of the form 'if not-p then nOIq', where p = 'the Son is identical with the divine essence' and q
= 'the Son can bring about reconciliation with God'. This claim is
true only ' if q is true (as we suppose it is) then p mu st be tru e'.
So, if the Son brings about reconciliation with God, then he must
be identical with the di vine essence. What would make such a
conditional true? We don't know what Owen and Mosser have in
mind. However, the general claim
(R) Reconciliation with some entity can only be effected by
that entity.
would do the trick. But clearly this claim is false. Third parties are
often brought in to help reconcile differences between two panies.
Sometimes third panies are essential 10 such reconciliation. Maybe
something weaker than (R) is supposed to do the trick:
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(R*) Reconciliation with a deity can only be effected by that
deity.
Now it is true that reconci liation with S requires that S accept
the reconciliation, but that does nOI imply that someone other than
S cannot be involved in effecting the reconciliation . And we ca n
hardly see why this would be any different with persons who are

God.
The first issue raised by Owen and Mosser' s comment has to
do with whether Latter-day Saints think that the Son is an independent or lesser deily. Now one issue in the background here is
whether Latter-day Saints can call their doctrine Social Trinitarian 54 o r whether they mus t settle for the heretical Trithei s m. We
don ' , think that the LDS doctrine of the Godhead fits very well
into traditional theolog ical categories, and so we will point out
where it is similar to Social Trinitarianis m and then perhaps where
it is not. According to Cornelius Plaminga, Social Trinitarianis m is
committed to at least three claims: (I) "The theory mu st ha ve
Father, Son. and Spirit as dis tinct centers of knowledge, will, love.
and action, ... land thu s] as distinct centers of consciousness or,
in s hort. as per:wnJ in some full sense of that term"; (2) divine
simplicity mu st not confl ict with poim number I ; and (3) Father,
Son, and Spirit arc one soc ial unit, and thi s is the fundamental
sense in which they are one. 55 Now thi s clearly sounds like LDS
theology. Given thi s definition of Social Trinitarianis m, we are
certainly Social Trinitarians.
Plantinga goes on further to claim that there are three senses
in which there is one God. There is the sense in which 'God' refers to the Father. There is the sense in which 'God ' refers to the
divine essence that all three divine persons share. And there is the
sense in which 'God' refers to the social unit of the Father, Son,
and Holy Spirit. Here. the only sense in which the Son (or the
Spirit) is God is the se nse in which the Son has the divine essence -that is, exemplifies the properties severally necessary and
54 Blake Ostler, in "Bridgi ng the Gulf," a review of How Wide the Divide?
in this vo tume. pp. 162-63, argues for a Social Trinitarian understanding of the
LOS conccpl of God.
55 Cornelius Pl antinga, "Social Trinity and Tritheism," in Trinity, IflCarnation. and Atonement (Notre Dame, tnd.: University of Notre Dame Press,
t989). 21-47. esp. 22.
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jointly sufficient for div inity. And in this sense, the term ' God ' is
being used as a predicate adjective. Do Latter·day Saints use the
term in a stronger sense, for example, as a predicate nominati ve?
Well, we have already seen that Joseph used the predicate
nominative sense in describing what we wilt become. 56 An ind i·
vidual human can become a God (predicate nominati ve). It would
be odd to say that Jesus is not also a God. But once we have
admitted thi s it seems that we are departing from Plantinga's version of Soc ial Trinitarianism. Indeed, once we say that God the
Father is a God, Jesus is a God, and the Spirit is a God (and not
merely the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Spirit is God),
then we have the logical implication that there are three Gods. Of
course, there is still onl y one God in the sense that there is on ly
one Father; there is onl y one God in the sense that there is one
soc ial unit that is the Godhead; and there is on ly one God in the
sense that there is one di vine essence. Whether this counts as
Tritheism probably depends on how you look at it-that is,
whether there is one or three Gods is a mailer of what you take to
be the sense of 'God ' .
Moreover, it should be clear also from the King Follett Discourse that, since God the Father takes a "hi gher" exa ltation than
Jesus, and Jesus progresses to God the Father's cu rrent leve l of
exaltation, Jesus' status is (at one time at least) in some sense lower
than God the Father's.57 This might see m to be somethi ng akin to
Arianism. However, it also mi ght be the case that Godhood is
something that one ac hieves once one has passed a certain level of
development. And then one can continue to surpass oneself once
one has passed thi s level but in a way that docs not make one any
more di vi ne than before. The Son may have achieved this level of
prog ression before this life and is thus fully God while he is
Jesus-and he is fully God even though he can progress to take
the place that God the Father once held. Corne lius Plantinga
poin ts to ontological subordinationi sm a<; an indicator of th e
Tritheist ic heresy.58 Owen and Mosser emphas ize that LDS theology fall s prey to this heresy. Clearly, there is some sort of subordinationism here in the Son's relationship to the Father, but it is
56 Sec Smith. "King Follcu Discourse:· 347.
57 See ibid .• 347-48.
58 Sec C. Plantinga. "Social Trinity and Tritheism:'

34.
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not clear that Latter-day Saints must accept an ontological subordinatio ni sm as Owen and Mosser suggest. But we must reemphasize the diffic ulty in trying to force LDS theology into the categories set up to deal with traditional Christian th eology. We doubt
this can be do ne without doin g damage to the LDS view, and so
we prefer mere ly to state the view withoul attaching a traditional
label to il.
The Social Trinitarian idea that there is just one divine soc ial
unit whom we wors hip and to whom we a re accountable is very
central to LDS thou ght. Owen and Mosser argue that suc h an un derstanding of the Godhead would not reconcile the reality of the
incarnati on and the atone ment with the monotheism of the Old
Testament. Now clearly the LDS view can say that the Son is a
God, and so the reality of the inca rnati on and ato nement is preserved . The question is whether the mo nothe ism of the Old Testament is preserved. If it is ass umed that the monothe ism of the
Old Testament is a me taph ysical thesis, then surely Owen and
Mosser are right. But why should we assume it is a metaph ys ical
thes is? After ail , the mon othei sm of the Old Testament is most
ofte n stated in contex.t s where there is a danger of worshipin g fa lse
gods. It was important to e mphasize to these people that you
could not be of two minds in worshi p-you could not hedge your
bets by foll owing various reli gious traditi ons. Either you worshiped the true God and Lo rd or you did not, and the re was o nl y
one way to do so . Soc ially there rea lly is no di ffere nce between a
state that is ruled by one king and one that is ruled by three who
desire the same thing and never disagree in how to acco mpli sh
their des ires. "On e di vine monarchy does not entail just one divine monarch . "59 LDS theol ogy is sociall y mo notheistic, and we
don' t see any reason to think that such a view is no t co nsonanl
with the Old Testament as a whole.
Another theolog ical o bjection to the LDS theology of the
Godhcad is that it does not account for fact that the Son 's at onement is infi nite.60 But in what respect is it infinite? Is it infinite in
the sense that it pays for an infinite number of sins in infini te
time? Is it in fi nite in the amount of sufferin g that would be e n59 Ibid .. )0.
60 Al ma )4:10 clearl y commits Lauer-day Saints to ,he clai m that th e
atoneme nt is infinite in some respect.
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tailed by undergo ing the event on the cross (or, as Latter-day
Saints believe, in Gethsemane)? Getting clear about the way in
which Christ's atonement is infinite is necessary if we are to deal
meanin gfully with the problem Owen and Mosser pose. For in deed, bei ngs that are finite in some respects might be infinite in
olhers. For ex ample, it is perfectly pm.~ ibl e for a m:lferial ohject to
have always ex isted and to always continue to ex ist. But then such
an object is infinite in the amount of time it ex ists. We can also
imagine beings who are limited by physical space, but who can
contemplate an infinite number of mathematical truths. Who is to
say that the Son's divinity is nOI infinite in precisely that dimension in which it would be necessary for him to make an infinite
paymen t?6 1 Some LaUer-day Sa ints believe that the dimension in
which the Son's atonement is infinite is in its application 10 persons. That is, there is '10 limil as to who can benefit from the
atonement. Indeed, this seems to be the import of our third Article
of Faith: "We believe that through the atonemen t of Christ all
mankind may be s aved." If this is so, the claim that Christ's
atonement is infinite is best understood as a denial of one of Calvin's fi ve theses- i.e., the thesis of limited atonement.
The theological error committed by Latter-day Saints, according to Owen and Mosser. is that we place the fount of divinity
in the person of God and not in hi s bcin g (see O&M, 52). However, it seems to us that the error is in going the other way. Placing
the font of di vinity in the bei ng of God rather than in hi s person is
to distance the divinity of God from hi s personality. What seems
to be implied is that God is not really a person, but instead there
are persons whose underlying being is God. Indeed, the Father is a
61 We are also suspicious of the entire Anselmiall theory of the atollement, which claims that it is a vicarious payment for sins. It is just Ilot clear that
an innocent person can justly pay for the si ns of the gUilty. Ansclm uses the
metaphor of paying off one's deb\. Here penal substitution is allowed. but debt
payment is an exception rather than a rule. And even if the payment model of the
atonement is unproble matic. it is not at all clear why we should think thai this
payment must be infinite. Do mortals commit an infinite number of sins? Surely
the re are only a finite number of thillgs that one persoll can do, and surely there
are only a finite number of mortals. So, it would seem that we cannot commit an
infinite numbe r of sins. Perhaps the pricc for our si ns is infinite cven though our
sillS are themselves only finite in number. But then thi s wou ld hardly seem to
satisfy any retributivlst (even lex talionis) theory of just punishment.
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person and the Father is God, but nol in the same respect. This is
not modalism. but it is just as perniciou s 10 the believer who would
like to relate to his God. The LOS view of the Godhead. on the
other hand, asserts that the Father, the Son, and the Spirit are Gods,
not just in their substance (i.e., some abstract divine essence that
111t~y s hart~) but in their personhood. They are Gods in the same
sense that a man mi ght be a king: it is a person thai is a God just
as it can be a person that is a king. And so when we pray to God
we are praying to an indi vidual person and not some abstract di·
vine essence. The LOS view of God is one to which the layman
can relate. Despite all the insistence that the tradi tional concept of
God is personal, we have a hard time seeing that this is more than
just a metaphor. For it certainly cannot mean the same thing as it
means when we say that Harry or Sally is a person. 62
Finally, the doctrine of Trinity is very phil osophicall y prob le matic (except in the Social Trinitarianism form congenial to
LOS theism, but rejected by Owen and Mosser). It is important for
Latter-day Saints to see that the appearance of philosophical incoherence in thi s doctrine is prima facie evidence against it, as well.
Indeed, at least, the traditional doctrine of the TrinilY makes the
following claims:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

The Father is God.
The Son is God.
The Holy Spirit is God.
The Father is not the Son.
The Father is nol the Holy Spirit.
The Son is not the Hol y Spirit.
There is exaclly one God. 63

Suppose we take the 'is' here to be the 'is' of identity. Then
we have gal a problem with the first six claims alone (nol to mention the seventh). Any beginning logic stude nt can derive the
contradiction . So, the 'is' here must not be an ' is' of identity. But
62 Indeed . Aquinas recognizes this and claims that personality is attributed to God only analogically and not literally. Sec Summa Theologica l a.13.7
and Summa contra Gentiles 1.34.
63 These seven claims arc take n verbatim from Richard Cartwright's insightful essay, "On the Logical Problem of the Trinity." in Philosophical Essays
(Ca mbridge: MIT Press, 1987). 188. Moreover. the arguments we make are
adapted from his essay. pages 187-200.
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it seems that clai ms 4--6 require the ' is' of identity and claims 1-3
seem to be more along the lines of an ' is' of predication. So, the
first claim really says "The Father is a God" and the fourth ,
"The Father is not identical with the Son," and so on for the rest.
But then claims 1-3 clearly imply that there are three Gods, and
this is a denial of 7. This is not the place for an extensive critique
of the traditional concept of the Trinity. Suffice it to say that there
is a problem here that is not easi ly solved.

Salvation
Soteriology and Anthropology
We think that Owen and Mosser, to their credit, have correctl y
summarized Robinson's soteriolog ical position. And they are
surely right to point out the sim ilarity between Armi nianism and
Robinson's soteriology.64 Owen and Mosser really do not have
much to say in the way of criticism of Robinson's soteri ology per
se. Instead, their critic isms apply to what they call his anthropoLogy (see O&M, 70-72). We will take this issue up now.
Although Owen and Mosser are in considerable agreement
with Robinson on sOleriology (given his Ann inianism), they d o
not accept his an thropology, since it is "se mi -Pelag ian" (see
O&M, 70-72). Needless to say, we think that Robinson's ant hropology is correct. The central point of concern (or contention) is
whether man can respond to God without prevenient grace, i.e., act
righteous ly of his own accord . Robin son claims that free will is a
part of man's nature and is preserved from the effects of the fall
by Christ'S atone me nt. So, we can make good choices on ou r own
and this ability is preserved by the atonement. Owen and Mosser
are right to point ou t that Ihis is a semi-Pelagian view. But they
are wrong, it seems, to claim that it is inconsistent with scripture. 65 They do not exp lain exact ly how each scripture they cile is
64 We are wary of Robinson's claim that Christ's me rits alone make us
eligible for salvation. It is a traditional view in the LDS community that Christ's
efforts arc combined with our own. And our own efforts do make a difference. But
for the purpose of this reply we will not challenge Robinson's view.
65 They also point out that it is inconsistent with a statement from the
Council of Orange (see O&M, 72). Here they are righ t. but we don't see that the
point docs not beg the question.
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supposed to contradict Ihe view that man has free will independenl
of God's grace, so we can only surmise. We will lake a couple of
examples and show how what the scripture says is consistent with
the LOS view.
One example is Acts 16: 14, in which it is said that the Lord
opened the heart of a certain woman of Lydia . Thi s implies that
God can open people' s hearts . But notice that il does not imply
that thi s chan ge was nol a result of some initiati ve on her part.
Furthermore. even if we suppose that this change of heart was nOI
the resuil of her initiative (thi s seems like theological dete rmin ism), we mi ght say that her heart had been hardened and she losl
what was once the ability to act freely. God's grace gave her Ihis
ability again. In other words, if it is the case that people can
squander their natural abil ity to choose by constantly c hoos in g
the wrong, then it could also be the case thaI God mi ght need to
intervene to return thi s gift.
Another example is Romans 9: 15- 16: "For he saith to Moses,
I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have
compassion on whom I will have co mpass ion. $0 then it is not o f
him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth
mercy." This example seems to be clearly cons istent with LDS
soteri ology and anthropology. It might seem that thi s scripture is
·say ing that we can do no willing of the good on our own. But thi s
is not the only reading. Indeed, we mi ght say that the sc ripture
says that any willing of the good on our own part will not be sufficient for salvation , and so God must make up by his me rcy for
what we cannot do by ou rselves .
A more difficult ex ample is I Corinthians 15: 10: " By the
grace of God I am what I a m." Thi s see ms to imply that our nature is determin ed by God. But of course this is a two-edged
sword. Such theological dete rminism would seem to impl y al so
that it is God's respon si bility when someone is unrighteous. We
need a more sophisticated interpretation of such a passage. Paul
was a bad person before hi s transforming ex perie nce on the road
to Damascus. That we have, by nature, an ability to c hoose righ t
from wrong does not preclude that we can't c hoose to become
bad characters, as Paul did . And once this choice is made, then it is
requ ired that God hel p us to c hange thi s character. We must be
willing to allow God to change o ur hearts for suc h a change to
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occur, but God does the work.66 This does not imply that we

could not have chosen to do the right from the outset.
Certainly after centuries of anli·Pelagian interpretation of the
scriptures, it might see m more natural to interpret such passages in
an orthodox (Calvini st or Arminian) way. But this is not to say
that the scriptures do not bear ou t a se mi-Pe lag ian interpretation.
O f course, to show this definitively would take much more work
than can be done in a short article.

Postmortem Salvation
Another unorthodox feature of LOS soterio logy is the idea of
postmortem salvation . Owen and Mosser recognize what they call
"the emot ive attractiveness" of the doctrine (O&M , 76). However,
th is is clearly to understate its attractiveness. This doctri ne is not
just attracti ve because it sati sfies some emot ional desire. Rather it
is attractive because it solves a theological dile mma that would remain unresolved otherwise. Supposedly God is perfectly ju st.
Moreover, sa lvation is acquired on ly throu gh knowledge of the
gospel (faith, repentance, baptism, and the g ift of the Holy Ghost).
However, many people have died without the chance to hear about
the gospel, much less the ab ility to respond to it. Relatively s peaking, that portion of the world throughout history that has he ard
the gospe l is small. These ignorant peop le will not be saved. It is
not just for so meone to punish people for failure to respond to
somet hing to which they never had the c hance to respond. So,
since God puni shes these ignorant people, he is not just. Someth ing must g ive. Postmortem salvation in LOS theology claims
that every person will have an equal chance to res pond to the gospel in thi s life o r the next. Ju stice is preserved . So, the attractiveness of the doctrine is much more than emotive, it is logical.
Of course, the me re fact that a theological doctri ne resolves a
dilemma is not reason to think that it is true (un less, perhaps, there
is no ot her resolution). But LOS theology is not committed to
suc h a doctrine on the basis of reason alone. Surely modern revelation is the source of this doctrine. Robinson attempts to show
that the doctrine has basis in ancient revelatio n. And a growing
66 Here we could interpret the heart as a first·orde r desire and our willingness to change our heart as a second-order desire.

260

FARMS REVIEW OF BOOKS li n ( 1999)

number of non-LDS Christians (including evangelicals) are beginning to reach the same conclu sion. 67 Bul even if it doesn', (as
Owen and Mosser presumably believe), it is nol contradicted b y
ancient revelation and so we Latter-day Saints can (and should )
interpret ancient reve lation in light of modem revelation . So even
if ancient scripture is most naturally interpreted so as to say nothing about postmortem salvation (contra Robin son), thi s assumption should not move us since as Latter-day Saints we are not
committed to the claim thai ancient scripture contain s everything
essenliallo salvation .
With that said we may still say something about Owen and
Mosser's scripture-based argument(s). They give the example of
Di ves, Lazarus, and Abraham. Dives is in Hades and the others in
paradise. Dives call s out to the others, wanting them to bring him
water. Abraham says that the chasm is fixed and he cannot cross
over. Owen and Mosser clai m that this entails that once you are
dead your fal e is fixed. But notice that this reasoning applies only
if we suppose thaI Dives did not have an opportuni ty to respond
positi ve ly to the gospel in his life. 68 Otherwise. we might say that
Dives 's fate was fixed because of his lack of response to the gos·
pel in his life. Realizing that he can no longer save himself Dives
wants Lazarus to return and call hi s brothers to repentance. Abra·
ham says that if they wouldn ' t respond to the scriptures then they
wou ldn ' t respond to someone who has risen from the dead. Owen
and Mosser claim that this again shows that this life is the only
chance. But it seems to us that this part of the story , rather, make s
the point that the unfaithful won't be converted by miracles. Certainly. Di ves's brothers are still alive and so, on Owen and
Mosser's theory , could still respond to the gospel. Moreover,
Latter-day Saints could argue that there is a very real sense in
which the chasm between those in hell and in Abraham's bosom
67 Among these most no tably is the prominent evangclical philosophcr
Stephen T. Davis. See his "U ni versalism, Hell and the Fate of the Ignorant,"
Modern Theology 6 (January 1990): 173-86. Sec also Gabriel Faekrc, "Divine
Perseverance," in Whal Aboul Those Who Have Never Heard, cd. John Sande rs
(Downers Grove, III .: InterVarsity. 1995, 71 - 106. Other evangelicals holding
this view include Donald Bloeseh, George Lindbeck, and Gcorge MacDonald.
68 Indeed, Lattcr.day Saints claim that those who will ha ve an opportunity
to respond to the gospel in the ne:tt life are those who did 1I0f have a chance in
this life.
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cannot be crossed at the time at which Dives fi nds himself there,
but that with the atonement and Christ's visit to the postmortal
spirit world that chasm is bridged. We could cite various biblical
passages in support of this interpretation (e.g., see Isaiah 24:22;
49:9; Luke 4: 18; and John 5:25).
Ironi cally, Owen and Mosser cite Book of Mormon passages
that appear to be problematic for the doctrine of postmortem sal·
vat ion (see O&M. 78 n. 185). The first passage they cite is Alma
12:24: "And we see that death comes upon mankind, yea, the
death which has been spoken of by Amu lek, which is the tempora l
death; nevertheless there was a space granted unto man in which
he might repent; therefore this life became a probat ionary state; a
time to prepare to meet God." They say thai "there simply is no
room for Robi nson's theology in this passage" (O&M, 78 n.
185). The passage does seem to equate "a space granted" with
"this life." And so it might seem that it is only this life in which
we can repent. But really all that fo llows is that this life is one
space that is granted for repentance and not that it is the only
space that is granted for repentance.
Owen and Mosser claim that Alma 34:32- 34 more strongly
precl udes the possibi lity of postmortem salvation. It says, "This
life is the time fo r men to prepare to meet God .... I beseech of
you that ye do not procrastinate the day of your repentance unt il
the e nd; for after this day of life, which is given us to prepare fo r
eternity, behold, if we do not improve our time wh ile in this life,
then cometh the night of darkness wherein there can be no labor
performed." This does seem to imply that if we don't repent in
this life then we never will. And so there must be no postmortem
salvation. However, this is not the on ly way to read the passage.
The next verse says why we won't repent in the next life if we
don't in this life: "That same spirit which doth possess yo ur
bodies at the time that ye go out of this life. that same spiri t will
have power to possess your body in that eternal world." This
seems to imply clearly that it is not because we are not given a n
opportunity to repent in the next life that we cannot do so, bUI
only because we have the same dispositions in the nex.t life as we
do in this life. Indeed, this implies that we will have the opportunity to repent but wi ll forsake it because of our dispos it ions.
This makes perfect sense. And this is qu ite harmonious with the
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practice of vicarious work for the dead si nce if some people did
not have Ihe oppo rtunity to repent in th is life then the ir
di spositions mi ght be such that they will do so in the ne xt life. For
those of us who have had pl enty of opportunity to repent in thi s

life but have fail ed 10 do S0, we will be very unlikely to c hange
o ur minds.

Conclusion
Owen and Mosser have two general goa ls in their review o f
How Wide the Divide? O ne is to show that th e di vide. even if it is
not as wide as we may have thought, is deep and profound . The
ot her is to elaborate on what they take 10 be proble ms with LOS
theo logy. Their rev iew is an important contribution to a co nt inu ed
theo logical dialogue between Latte r-day Saints and evange licals.
What is even more signi ficant is that their recognition that the di vide is either wider or deeper than Robinson and Blomberg ad mit
does not dete r in any way their willingness to engage Latte r-day
Saints in a fri endl y and open dialogue. Indeed, the di stance between our respecti ve theolog ies shoul d have nothing to do with the
ex tent to which we show each other Christl ike charity. Nevertheless, we do believe that there are signifi cant theolog ical diffe re nces
and that these di fferences are not merely academic but have an
effect on the very nature a nd possibility of our sa lvation. Since
Owe n and Mosser conclude by ide nti fy ing where LOS beliefs remain " unacceptab ly outside the boundaries of Christian orthodoxy" (O&M, 8 1), it may be usefu l for us to set out several poi nts
where evangelicals are unfortunately outside the boundaries of
mode rn revel ation: ( I) a theo logicall y unacceptable form of
theistic absolutism which hold s that God is the ground of all be in g
and thus apparently ult imate ly responsible for all the evi l that
occurs; (2) an acceptance of the trad itional doctrine of the Tri nity
in which the Father and the Son, although separate persons, are the
same substance ; (3) a denial of the ability inherent in each indi vidual to choose between right and wrong without prevenie nt
grace; (4) an acceptance of the clai m that those who do not have a
c hance to receive the gospel in thi s li fe will nevertheless be
damned in the ne xt. Opposing these evange lical tenets are th e
LOS doctrines revealed to Joseph Smith about the nature of God,
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the importance of free agency, and vicarious work for the dead.
Indeed , it is our com mitment to modern revelation and the evangelical reject ion of it that provides the respective epistemological
bases for our differing theological views. And so it seems our
whole debate could turn on this one point.
This rejo inder agrees with Owen and Mosser that even if the
divide is not as wide as we mi ght have expected, the chasm is deep
in certai n fundamental ways. Moreover, we have attempted to respond to the criti cisms of those LDS doctrines with which Owen
and Mosser are in disagreement. We have also suggested that the
evangel ical doctrines themselves suffer from certain notorious
philosophical difficulties not encoun tered by LDS theology. We
believe that both reason and revelation support the LDS position.
Clearl y, Owen and Mosser believe similarly about their position.
Nevertheless, even if none of us is persuaded by the other's arguments, the interchange helps to en lighten ou r minds as to the nature of our own beliefs and commitmen ts. Our own formulations
of our beliefs have been sharpened and altered by engaging in
thi s discussion. LDS theology is young and unenc umbered. Evangelicals have been ponderin g their theological doctrines for ce ntu ~
ries. We can surely learn from them, juS! as we think they can
learn from modern revelation. We agree with B. H. Roberts when
he says:
It requires striving- intellectual and spiritual- to co m-

prehend the things of God-even the revealed things
of God . ...
Mental laziness is the vice of men, espec ially with
reference to divine things. Men seem to think that because in spiration and revelation are factors in connection wi th the things of God, therefore the pain and
stress of mental effort are not required. 69
Although we believe revelation is the starting and endin g po int
of the search for religious truth, critical thought is essential along
the way to understandin g. Robinson and Blomberg have started us
down a path of critical discussion that can only help us to better
69 B. H. Roberts, "Divine Immanence and the Holy Ghost," in Seventy 's
COIlrse in Theology: Fifth Year (Dallas: Taylor, 1976), 2:iv- v, emphasis added.

264

FARMS REVIEW OF BOOKS 1112 (1999)

comprehend our respective traditions and to respect those of Olhers. We hope this path will be well traveled.

